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Abstract 
 
Suppose that animals have rights. If so, may you go down to your local farm store, buy some 
chicks, raise them in your backyard, and eat their eggs? You wouldn¶t think so. But we argue, to 
the contrary, that you may. Just as there are circumstances in which it¶s permissible to liberate a 
slave, even if that means paying into a corrupt system, so there are circumstances in which it¶s 
permissible to liberate chickens by buying them. Moreover, we contend that restrictions on 
freedom of movement can be appropriate for chickens, but not humans, because of the obvious 
differences between the interests of healthy, adult humans versus those of chickens who have been 
bred for human use. We also argue that egg consumption is permissible based on the plausible 
assumption that no one¶s rights are violated in their consumption, and so while there may 
sometimes be morally preferable uses for eggs, you do nothing unjust in eating them. If we¶re 
right, then the rights view doesn¶t imply that veganism is obligatory; rather, it implies that the 
constraints on how we source animal products, though highly demanding, are not so demanding 
that they can¶t be met. 
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Introduction  
 
Marie-Thérèse Coincoin (c.1742 ± 1820) was owned by the de Soto family in Louisiana. When 
she was 25, the family loaned her out to Claude Thomas Pierre Metoyer. Coincoin and Pierre came 
to live together in a kind of common-law marriage, at least until the local priest objected. Pierre¶s 
solution was to purchase and liberate Coincoin, and then later a number of their children ² who, 
having been born prior to Coincoin¶s manumission, were still the property of the de Sotos. In 1786, 
Pierre gave in to social pressure and married a white French woman, ending his relationship with 
Coincoin. However, he gave her a plot of land and an annuity, making her financially independent. 
Over the next several years, she purchased the rest of her children, one of her son¶s daughters, and 
her own sister, freeing them all.1 
Was it wrong for Pierre to buy Coincoin, or for Coincoin to purchase her children? It seems 
plain that her actions were permissible: what else could she have done? And if his actions were 
wrong, it isn¶t clear that the wrongness stems from the purchasing itself. What¶s troubling about 
Pierre¶s behaviour is that he was willing to µborrow¶ Coincoin in the first place, and that he began 
a relationship with her before purchasing and liberating her ² not that, in an attempt to save a 
relationship that began under objectionable circumstances, he took the only course of action 
available. 
 The above suggests the following: even if there¶s something inherently objectionable about 
purchasing a person ² and thereby providing financial support to a corrupt and harmful system 
² its badness can be outweighed by sufficiently strong considerations. Our aim here is to show 
one way in which this point is relevant to animal ethics. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that 
nonhuman animals2 have rights. Then, some animals ² such as the chicks that are for sale in local 
farm stores ² are relevantly similar to the victims of slavery. Though it seems plausible that any 
proponent of animal rights is committed to saying that you shouldn¶t buy those chicks, we argue 
to the contrary: there is no tension between the thesis that animals have rights and the moral 
permissibility of buying those animals:KDW¶VPRUHZHDUJXHWKDWLW¶VSHUPLVVLEOHWRNHHSthem 
in our backyards and eat their eggs. Or, at least, LW¶VSHUPLVVLEOHin certain circumstances. 
To be clear, we don¶t want to draw a straight line between the ethics of purchasing humans 
and the ethics of purchasing animals.3 As we¶ll argue, there are some important differences 
between the cases, and we are well aware of the risks of drawing simplistic parallels between 
chattel slavery and the various ways in which we exploit the members of other species. Still, the 
analogy is a helpful one when employed carefully ² as demonstrated, of course, by the way that 
Singer (1975) and Regan (1983) used it to help us appreciate our obligations to animals. 
Obviously, the conclusions about keeping chickens and eating their eggs go beyond the 
resources of the analogy with which we began, so we provide independent arguments for them. In 
short, we contend that restrictions on freedom of movement are appropriate for chickens, but not 
humans, because of the obvious differences between the interests of healthy, adult humans versus 
those of chickens who have been bred for human use. We argue that egg consumption is 
permissible based on the plausible assumption that no one¶s rights are violated in their 
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consumption, and so while there may be morally preferable uses in some cases, you do no wrong 
in eating them. 
One implication of our argument is that the view that animals have rights doesn¶t imply 
that veganism is obligatory. Rather, it implies that there are demanding constraints on how we 
source animal products, but not so demanding that they can¶t be met by many of the people who 
are in a position to read this essay. 
In the next section, we set out a case for animal rights, and clarify why you might think 
that it implies that it¶s impermissible to buy chickens. In the one that follows, we argue for the 
three parts of our thesis. We then consider some objections before concluding with two caveats. 
 
 
The Rights View 
 
One of us lives just a few miles away from a Tractor Supply store, whose parent company bills 
itself as µthe largest operator of rural lifestyle retail stores in the United States¶.4 At select times of 
the year, you can buy baby chicks there: White Leghorn hybrids, Rhode Island Reds, ISA Browns, 
Andalusians, Ameraucana [sic] hybrids, and more. Of course, your desire for chickens might not 
line up with one of the store¶s µChick Days¶, so you can always order online. For a mere $34.99 
USD (free shipping!), you can have ten Rhode Island Reds delivered to your local Post Office, 
where they need to be picked up within 24 hours. 
There are a range of welfare problems associated with backyard chickens, but the 
associated industry is at least as worrying. When chicks are hatched to get layers rather than 
broilers, the male chicks are expendable: they are typically killed using large grinders. If females 
aren¶t sold to places like Tractor Supply, then they are likely to be debeaked, sent to produce eggs 
in intensive farming environments, and then killed after one or two years (when they become less 
productive). This industry is thus associated with a range of practices to which advocates of animal 
rights object: the killing of male chicks and less productive hens, suffering inflicted by debeaking, 
confinement and transport, objectification of animals, denying chickens the chance to engage in 
the kinds of behaviours that are valuable to them, the destruction and exploitation of social and 
familial bonds, and so forth. 
Given all of this, it¶s easy to see why someone might think that, if animals have rights, it¶s 
wrong to buy chickens from your local Tractor Supply store. That is, if we suppose that many 
animals are entitled to respectful treatment as a matter of justice, it seems plausible that you 
shouldn¶t make yourself complicit in disrespectful treatment ² which you would, it seems, were 
you to purchase chicks. 
Consider, for instance, the most influential account of animal rights in the philosophical 
literature: namely, Tom Regan¶s µrights view¶.5 Regan is concerned with beings who are µsubjects-
of-a-life¶. In The Case for Animal Rights, his magnum opus, he¶s deliberately conservative, 
limiting the class of µsubjects-of-a-life¶ to µmentally normal mammals of a year or more¶. 
µWherever we draw the relevant line¶, he says, µthese animals are above it¶.6 Nonetheless, it¶s fair 
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to say that (many) chickens meet the subject-of-a-life criterion: they possess beliefs, desires, 
perception, memory, a sense of the future, an emotional life, interests, and a lasting psychological 
identity; they can feel pleasure and pain; they can initiate action; and their life can fare well or ill 
for them.7 
Regan contends that all subjects-of-a-life possess equal inherent value, and so we ought to 
treat them in accord with his µrespect principle¶: µWe are to treat those individuals who have 
inherent value in ways that respect their moral value¶.8 This means that they must always be treated 
as objects of value, and not merely as containers of value ² this is one of Regan¶s objections to 
utilitarianism, which, he claims, treats beings as mere µreceptacles¶ of value.9 The respect 
principle, in turn, grounds a right to respectful treatment.10 Derivatively, animals have rights 
against being killed, being made to suffer, being treated as objects that exist solely for the benefit 
of others, and so on. What¶s more, the respect principle grounds an obligation not to support those 
who violate the rights of animals: we shouldn¶t aid or abet rights violations, and respect for victims 
involves disassociating ourselves from those who victimize them. 
Based on what we said above, the rights view seems to be committed to saying that the egg 
industry fails to respect chickens, and so is unjust. And if that¶s right, then the rights view also 
implies that it¶s wrong to support that industry. As Regan puts it:  
 
Since [the animal-agriculture] industry routinely violates the rights of [farmed] animals, it 
is wrong to purchase its products. That is why, on the rights view, [veganism] is morally 
obligatory, and why, on that view, we should not be satisfied with anything less than the 
total dissolution of commercial animal agriculture as we know it, whether modern factory 
farms or otherwise.11 
 
 
In Defence of Backyard Chickens 
If, however, ZH¶YHJRWRegan¶s view of animal agriculture, it seems reasonable to think about 
Tractor Supply Co. as being somewhat akin to a slave trader: both perpetuate the routine violation 
of fundamental rights, and both profit from these violations. And if that analogy holds, then we 
should re-evaluate the decision to buy chicks in light of what we said about the ethics of purchasing 
slaves to liberate them. To make it permissible to support the slave trade, you would need 
sufficiently strong reasons ² e.g., the chance to rescue an innocent victim of the trade. Might there 
be such reasons here? 
Presumably, we won¶t be able to appeal to the sort of familial bonds to which we first 
alluded ² no chick is one of your children.12 And we¶ll be the first to grant that you have strong 
moral reasons not to support an industry that exploits beings with inherent value. But let¶s imagine 
that you¶re motivated to liberate chickens, rather than simply to benefit at their expense.13 (That¶s 
not to say that your sole motivation must be rescue,14 but if your own interest is paramount, you¶re 
failing to treat the chickens with the respect that, on the rights view, they¶re owed.) You have a 
strong moral reason to save any individuals you can from that industry, as the difference you can 
Page 5 of 16 
 
make in the lives of each of those chickens is vastly greater than any support you¶re offering to a 
morally corrupt business. 
After all, many of these chickens will go on to live rather brief lives. Members of all of the 
breeds mentioned earlier can live for at least five years, and some for as many as fifteen. However, 
within two or three years, the vast majority will be killed by predators, disease, or their owners ² 
who have no interest in feeding chickens after they stop producing large numbers of eggs, and so 
slaughter them for meat. Granted, the life of a backyard chicken is, in some respects, much better 
than the life of a chicken raised in intensive conditions. Still, we shouldn¶t have too rosy a picture 
of their well-being. Many chicken coops aren¶t substantially larger than those available to chickens 
in enriched-cage agricultural settings, and backyard chickens often lack the benefit of regular 
medical care. Moreover, unlike those in enriched-cage settings, backyard chickens are vulnerable 
to snakes and other predators who can enter their coop. Of course, backyard chickens are often 
allowed to roam, but the available environment puts them at further risk. Most backyards don¶t 
provide the cover and secluded perches that would allow chickens to avoid hawks, raccoons, dogs, 
and other suburban wildlife. This can make the chickens highly anxious. They are the descendants 
of wild junglefowl, who live out their lives in the dense foliage of the forests of southeast Asia. 
Today¶s chickens have inherited a psychology that was forged in that context, as well as the high 
stress levels that those birds experience when their protective cover is removed. An informed and 
conscientious person could address many of these issues, but most purchasers won¶t. So, you have 
the power to make a significant difference for any individual you purchase. 
Granted, there¶s a trade-off here, and we¶ll say more about it later: if you buy chicks, you 
are supporting a morally corrupt industry. However, at first glance, the trade-off seems worth it. 
Moreover, it¶s being worth it seems to follow from Regan¶s liberty principle: 
 
Provided that all those involved are treated with respect, and assuming that no special 
considerations obtain, any innocent individual has the right to act to avoid being made 
worse off even if doing so harms other innocents.15 
 
If you have this liberty for yourself, then surely you have it for others: that is, provided that all 
those involved are treated with respect, you have the right to act to prevent others from being made 
worse off, even if doing so harms other innocents ² i.e., even if you¶re contributing to harms to 
other chickens as a result of your support for the corrupt business.16 
 But what about the provisos in that principle? Are you treating the chickens that you don¶t 
purchase with respect if you buy certain others? Given your intention ² namely, to save particular 
individuals ² and the limits imposed by the situation, it¶s hard to see how you might be failing to 
treat the chickens that you don¶t purchase with respect, even if others are clearly treating them 
with disrespect. Indeed: you are showing all the respect you can; you are acting based on the 
thought that each subject-of-a-life matters. 
What about the other proviso? Are there any special considerations that obtain ² that is, 
can you justly liberate the particular individuals you might want to? This is precisely what Regan 
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might want to deny. Nevertheless, he shouldn¶t. If he does ² e.g., by saying that it¶s never 
permissible to support a corrupt system so that good may come ² then he seems to be committed 
to saying the same thing about &RLQFRLQ¶VSXUFKDVHRIKHUFKLOGUHQ. That seems flatly wrong. 
 So given the rights view, it seems to be permissible to buy chicks. If so, you¶ll be obliged 
to liberate them ² or come as close to that as you can. But liberating chickens is no small feat. 
They have few natural defences against predators; there is no wild community for them to join; 
and as a result of the way they are bred, there is no life for them outside human care. In such 
circumstances, your obligation seems to be to provide those individuals with sanctuary. And if 
that¶s right, then we come to the question of what to do with the eggs that those chickens lay. On 
the face of it, at least, you don¶t seem to violate anyone¶s rights if you eat them; so, it seems 
permissible to do so.  
 Someone might worry about the moves in this last paragraph. Hasn¶t this line of thought 
been tried before, with dangerous conclusions? Consider the following passage from an 1845 
debate over the sinfulness of purchasing slaves, in which both parties were opposed to slavery, but 
disagreed over whether it was permissible to purchase a slave and benefit from her labour. Here is 
the centrepiece of the argument from Nathan Rice, who thought that it was permissible: 
 
I maintain, that when by buying and holding a slave, I can materially improve his condition, 
the golden rule, which bids us to do to others as we would that they should do to us, requires 
me to do it. And although I hold slavery to be a great evil, yet, in purchasing a slave, under 
such circumstances, I am committing no sin, but am doing what the law of God requires. 
But the gentleman quoted the passage: ³Love worketh no ill to his neighbor.´ Very true: it 
does not. And do I do an injury to my neighbor in the case I have just stated? ... What! 
Because I cannot do him all the good I would, do I injure him by doing what good I can? 
If I am not able, without disregarding other paramount duties, to buy him and give him his 
liberty; or if circumstances are such, that manumission could not improve his condition; 
yet, if I greatly better his condition in that relation, and do this at his own earnest request, 
do I violate the law of love? ² What profound absurdity! ... I have never pleaded that 
slavery ought to have existed, or that it ought to be continued. Never. All I insist on is, that 
the slave-holder should not be announced at the worst of malefactors because he finds 
himself born in the midst of it.17 
 
Our argument looks suspiciously close to this one, and insofar as this one strikes us as specious, 
that¶s trouble for the line that we¶ve been pushing. 
There is indeed a problem with Rice¶s argument, but that problem doesn¶t create any issues 
for us. Rice goes wrong in the way that he understands the phrase µmaterially improve his 
condition¶, in the countervailing µparamount duties¶ to which he appeals, and in his pessimism 
about being able to liberate the individual in question. It¶s implausible that µhis condition¶ ² i.e., 
the slave¶s ² would be improved to the relevant level, implausible that he has any other duties so 
pressing as to justify not giving this person his freedom, and implausible that there is no way to 
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provide that freedom. But in the case of chickens, all three points are quite plausible. It is indeed 
possible to provide, in a suburban backyard, chickens with about the best life available to them; 
there are indeed reasons to eat the eggs, such as the importance of minimizing food waste; and 
µliberation¶ for a chicken is just death in the talons of predatory birds, in the jaws of foxes, or under 
the tires of a car. So Rice was mistaken: it would be wrong to buy and keep a human slave in the 
circumstances he describes. However, the differences between his circumstances and the ones that 
we¶ve been describing are precisely those that make it permissible to buy, and benefit from, 
chickens. Again, the primary goal shouldn¶t be to guarantee your egg supply; that motivation 
would, arguably, be disrespectful to the animals. But that needn¶t be your sole motivation, and, if 
it isn¶t, then buying chickens, and eating their eggs, needn¶t be objectionable. 
 
 
Objections and Replies 
 
Let¶s consider some objections.  
 
Purchase chickens from a store, and that will support the trafficking of more chickens. 
 
There are a number of strategies that we might employ to reply to this objection. The most obvious 
is to reject the assumption on which it¶s based: namely, that purchasing makes a difference. If we 
go this route, we just deny that you¶re supporting the trafficking of more chickens in any 
meaningful sense, as your purchase doesn¶t affect whether any future individual is created. Given 
all the slack in the system, we shouldn¶t expect your purchase to affect the overall number of 
chickens in the next generation.18 
For the sake of argument, though, let¶s assume that you do make a difference. Still, no one 
should think that you¶re making much difference. It isn¶t as though the purchase of a chicken result 
in the immediate slaughter of another chicken: any relationship between your purchase and 
negative effects for animals is going to be indirect, complex, and probabilistic. In the case of 
buying baby chicks, however, you are saving lives. So, we have to weigh that indirect, complex, 
and probabilistic sort of support for rights violations with your ability to prevent a particular 
individual from having her rights violated in the near future. It seems fairly clear that the latter is 
the better option. 
 Alternatively, we might appeal to the doctrine of double effect: it¶s generally permissible 
to rescue a being from exploitation, and your support for the trafficking of more chickens is a 
foreseen but unintended consequence of your strategy. Were another strategy open to you ² that 
is, were it possible to save those particular chickens without supporting the trafficking, that may 
well be what you ought to do. (More on this later.) But that often won¶t be possible, and so the 
doctrine of double effect allows you to rescue them. Of course, this strategy relies upon the truth 
of the doctrine of double effect, which is hardly uncontroversial. 
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So from the perspective of the rights view, perhaps the most compelling response is that if 
chickens have rights, then they likely have a right to rescue. After all, if chickens have any rights 
at all, then they have the right to protection from rights violations. And what¶s a right to rescue 
other than the corollary of the right to such protection? A chicken¶s right to rescue might not imply 
that any particular individual has a duty to rescue ² that duty might fall, for example, on the state 
² but when no one else is rescuing chickens, it certainly means that a conscientious individual is 
permitted to rescue them. Indeed, it may be the commendable thing to do.  
Granted, if it were certain that rescuing someone would directly result in the rights of 
another being violated, then perhaps we ought not to intervene. But as we¶ve said, no one should 
be certain about having that kind of direct effect: we may not be causally impotent, but we still 
can¶t be certain of the effects of our actions. Given that, we are merely taking a risk that, in 
purchasing one chicken, we will have some causal responsibility for the violation of the rights of 
another. And that seems a risk worth taking, given that it is the fundamental rights of the rescued 
chicken ² to bodily integrity, to freedom from fear, etc. ² that are at stake.  
 
Purchasing chickens reinforces the idea that they are mere property. 
 
To be clear, objection here isn¶t the deontological one that purchasing chickens treat them as 
property, and is therefore wrong. We¶ll consider that challenge next. This is, instead, a 
consequentialist objection, and so requires replies in those terms. We offer three. First of all, your 
impact on the broader perception of chickens is trivial relative to your impact on the lives of the 
chickens you save. And the latter is more important than the former. Second, there is no reason 
why purchasing chickens couldn¶t be joined with campaigning for chickens¶ rights, so that any 
negative impact of the purchasing could be offset by the positive impact of campaigning ² 
campaigning that may even be made easier by keeping chickens of one¶s own. Third, and perhaps 
most importantly, the greatest testimony to your views about chickens will be in the way that you 
treat them, and your greatest impact on how people view chickens is going to result from their 
appreciating the sacrifices you are willing to make on their behalf. Someone willing to buy 
medicine for a sick chicken says volumes more about the value of that life than someone who 
abstains from having any relationship at all with such animals.  
 
Purchasing chickens treats them as property. 
 
Now on to the deontological version of the challenge. If it¶s contrary to animals¶ rights to be treated 
as property, and if purchasing an animal invariably involves treating her as property, then that 
would be a problem for our argument. Regan¶s position on this is unclear, but, in any case, not all 
proponents of animal rights would accept the assumptions behind this objection. Alasdair 
Cochrane, for instance, links the rights of animals to their interests, and claims that animals don¶t 
possess an interest in not being property; thus, they have no right against being property.19 
However, this has been challenged by his critics. Jason Wyckoff20 and Friederike Schmitz21 argue 
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that animals have an interest in not belonging to a system in which they can be owned, even if 
particular instances of ownership may not be harmful to them, and one might also worry about 
what Cochrane¶s arguments would mean ² given his rejection of speciesism ² for the prospect 
of owning less-autonomous humans.22 So we may have good reason to doubt that treating an 
animal as property is consistent with respecting the animal¶s rights. 
We take no stand here on whether animals possess a right not to be owned.23 However, 
even if Wyckoff and Schmitz are correct, there are two reasons why this isn¶t a serious challenge 
to our thesis. First, there are the harms faced by chicks who are bought by someone who gives no 
thought to liberating them. It¶s bizarre to think that a chick¶s putative right not to be treated as 
property ² a right infringed upon either way ² wouldn¶t be outweighed by the very strong 
interests that the chick possesses in avoiding the infliction of suffering and death. Indeed, the 
interest-based rights approach explicitly allows for this kind of case:24 Though the chicks may 
possess a prima facie right against being treated as property, they surely don¶t possess a concrete 
(or all-things-considered) right in this case, as their interest in not being treated as property would 
be outweighed by their interest in avoiding other harms. 
Someone might object that this reply relies too strongly upon the interest-based rights 
approach, arguing that a firmer rights theory ² perhaps including Regan¶s rights view ² would 
not permit this kind of trading-off of rights. If rights are side-constraints, then, barring µcatastrophic 
moral horror¶,25 we may not violate them, and thus mustn¶t purchase the chicks. This leads to our 
second response to this challenge. It isn¶t clear that the µpurchasing¶ of chicks in this case amounts 
to treating the chicks as property. Rather than purchasing the chicks, we¶re paying for their 
freedom (or as close to freedom as they can achieve). In this sense, the action is more morally 
analogous to paying the bail of a wholly innocent victim of a corrupt justice system than it is to 
purchasing a slave. Once the money changes hands, whatever the legal situation (i.e., your 
ownership of a chick), it¶s appropriate for us to think of the chick as liberated. On this picture, 
morally speaking, at no point was the chick treated as property by you. While she may have been 
treated as property by another, your actions released her from being treated as property. To put 
this another way: providing it¶s carried out with the firm intention to release the chick, it makes 
sense to say that purchasing a chick doesn¶t involve treating the chick as property, even if it 
certainly entails the seller treating the chick as property ² something she was doing either way. 
 
Liberating chickens is permissible, but eating their eggs amounts to deriving an illegitimate benefit 
from a permissible action. 
 
The claim here is that while we may permissibly derive benefit from liberating animals ² we 
permissibly benefit in all kinds of ways from the companionship offered by rescued dogs, for 
example ² this particular benefit is one that is illegitimate. This challenge could be grounded in 
a number of ways, each of which warrant its own response. 
First, someone might claim that hens have an interest in and/or right to raise a family, and 
taking their eggs (and failing to allow them access to cockerels) can scupper their chances of doing 
Page 10 of 16 
 
so. Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka support the idea of offering chickens a chance to raise a 
family if they wish to, but, as they recognize, this is perfectly compatible with taking excess eggs 
from chickens.26 Donaldson and Kymlicka are also opposed to permitting chickens unrestricted 
opportunity to breed and raise a family,27 as domesticated animals may lack the ability to self-
regulate their reproduction; chickens living in a backyard could presumably very quickly 
overpopulate, thus µcreat[ing] unsustainable burdens on the scheme of cooperation¶.28 Instead, they 
argue, we should aim for µsocially sustainable¶ populations.29 In a household environment, this is 
often going to mean denying animals the chance to breed. If there¶s room for more animals, on the 
other hand, it would make sense to rescue existing animals rather than bring new ones into 
existence. 
Second, someone could insist that eggs belong to the chickens, not us.30 If it matters that 
we rescue animals from the status of property, it would be strange to have so little respect for their 
property ² as, the charge goes, we would if we were to take their eggs without a second thought. 
One way of countering this, of course, is to reject the idea of chickens owning their eggs, or more 
radically, of animal property rights generally. Another is to observe that the chickens generally 
don¶t seem to mind our taking their eggs, and we might construe this as a kind of tacit consent for 
our taking them. But let¶s assume, for the sake of argument, that chickens do own their eggs and 
would prefer us not to take them. Even if so, we needn¶t frame our taking of them as theft, just as 
we needn¶t frame the chickens living on our land as squatters or trespassers. In liberating chickens 
and choosing to live with them, we have entered into a relationship with the chickens, but the 
benefits of this relationship can go two ways ² just as the benefits of companionship can accrue 
to both dogs and humans. We might even think of the eggs as a kind of rent, or the product of 
animal labour; in exchange for this rent or labour, we provide the chickens with a space in which 
to live, food and other benefits, and a chance of retirement (i.e., a place to live once no longer 
µproductive¶).31 Doing so is consistent with affirming the highest moral standing to these chickens, 
just as expecting human family members to contribute to the running of a household ² even if 
that requires a sacrifice of their labour or property ² is consistent with according them the highest 
levels of moral standing. 
Third, one could claim that there¶s something inherently illegitimate about the 
consumption of animal products. This kind of thought is sometimes seen, for instance, in 
discussions about in vitro meat32 or plant-based products made to seem like animal products.33 It¶s 
striking that these arguments are normally made in the context of the consumption of (products 
akin to) flesh, rather than other animal products, and it¶s possible that the argument holds when it 
comes to flesh, but not when it comes to other animal products.34 While it¶s true that consuming 
the eggs of rescued chickens might, in some very small sense, contribute to a culture of egg 
consumption, or make us more open to the consumption of eggs more generally, it isn¶t clear what 
right possessed by a liberated chicken would be violated by the consumption of her egg. Even if 
there were some non-rights-based moral reason that speaks against such consumption, this could 
presumably not outweigh the good of providing the chicken with a safe and happy home. If it 
could, given that there are those who are only happy to rescue chickens because they will provide 
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eggs, we would be forced to condemn chickens ² who could otherwise be rescued ² to sad, short 
lives so we can avoid their eggs being eaten by a potential rescuer. That¶s perverse. 
Finally, we note that it seems plainly permissible to use the eggs for other purposes. For 
example, the eggs could be fed to other animals ² a routine practice at some sanctuaries. 
Alternatively, eggs could be given to those humans who will be eating them either way. (Even if 
it¶s morally questionable to support egg-eating, if eggs are going to be eaten, better they are eggs 
from well-cared-for backyard hens than the product of animal agriculture.35) Another possibility 
is selling the eggs for money that can be used to make both the chickens and their carers materially 
better-off. There are those who insist that no animal product is food for us,36 but since some uses 
are permissible, it¶s hard to see what¶s morally special about eating them.  
 
 
Two Caveats  
 
Having responded to several objections to our thesis, it¶s now worth explicitly setting out two 
caveats. 
 
Permissible Benefits 
 
The first concerns the benefits it¶s permissible to enjoy as a consequence of liberating animals, 
chickens among them. It¶s emphatically not our argument that we¶re entitled to benefit from 
rescued animals once we¶ve liberated them, nor that any benefit¶s fair game. It wouldn¶t be 
permissible, for example, to µrescue¶ a chicken to kill her for flesh; in such a situation, it would be 
difficult to see how she was being rescued at all.37 More importantly, on the kind of normative 
picture we¶re assuming, killing a chicken would involve violating the chicken¶s rights. This would 
be the case even were the chicken µrescued¶ from a worse situation; i.e., she could live out a slightly 
longer life in slightly better conditions before eventually being killed. Extreme scenarios aside, 
seriously harming a chicken ² such as by killing her or making her suffer ² is impermissible, 
whether we have rescued her or not, even if she would be harmed more in some counterfactual 
scenario. 
So while we¶re permitted to take the eggs of rescued chickens, we¶re not permitted to kill 
them for their flesh.38 It¶s easy to imagine a parallel argument to the one we have presented that 
could, at least in principle, justify the use of rescued sheep and goats for wool or manure ² though 
meat and hides would be out of the question, and milk would be extremely tricky due to the need 
for impregnation and removal of the lamb/kid. Equally, while rescued animals could feasibly be 
used as companions, guards, or grass-cutters, various forms of harmful hard labour will be 
impermissible, even if the kinds of uses to which the animals would otherwise have been put would 
have been worse. If animals have rights, we must respect these rights ² even if others fail to do 
so. 
All of this meshes comfortably with our intuitions about Coincoin. She doesn¶t do wrong 
by benefitting from the labour of those she has liberated ² her family-members, naturally enough, 
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contributed to the running of her household and plantation ² but she would do wrong were she to 
µliberate¶ slaves only to use them for hard labour, inflict gratuitous suffering on them, or kill them. 
It makes sense to imagine an abolitionist estate utilizing the labour of former slaves, but it doesn¶t 
make sense to imagine an abolitionist estate utilizing the physical abuse and confinement of 
µformer¶ slaves to encourage hard work. (We note that Coincoin, though reputedly a good owner, 
did purchase slaves to work her land, so it would perhaps be inaccurate to call her plantation an 
abolitionist estate.) Similarly, we can imagine an animal-rights-respecting household benefitting 
from the eggs of rescued hens, but it makes no sense to imagine an animal-rights-respecting 
household slaughtering µrescued¶ hens for their flesh. 
 
Better Not to Pay 
 
Given that paying for chickens may involve supporting harms, we grant that it¶s generally morally 
better if chickens are not purchased, but are instead rescued in a way that does not involve financial 
support for chicken-harming industries. Most obviously, this means that it¶s preferable to adopt 
chickens from a rescue. Money can then be given to the rescue to make life materially better for 
other chickens (or kept, helping pay for the needs of the newly adopted chickens), and this creates 
space at the rescue. Rather than risking the creation of more chickens for sale, we¶re thus creating 
an opportunity for more chickens to be saved. Alternatively, but generally less likely, we could 
receive chickens as a gift or inheritance, find chickens on the roadside, or what have you. When it 
comes to buying chickens, haggling, or even asking for µsurplus¶ chickens for free, may allow you 
to limit your financial contribution to chicken-harming industries and your contribution to 
incentivizing the breeding of many chickens.39 
However, its being morally better not to pay for chickens is perfectly compatible with its 
being permissible to pay for them. This would be true even if, to borrow a phrase from animal 
activism, we were to accept a defeasible obligation to µadopt not shop¶; i.e., if we were to accept 
that we generally have a requirement to adopt a chicken rather than purchase one.40 Adopting 
chickens isn¶t always feasible, given the present institutional relationships that human societies 
have with chickens. It isn¶t the case that every town has a chicken sanctuary, and so isn¶t the case 
that everyone has easy access to adoptable chickens.41 At least some who don¶t have easy access 
to adoptable chickens will have access to purchasable chickens. Presumably, such individuals 
would be permitted to purchase chickens to rescue them even if they have a pro tanto obligation 
to adopt rather than purchase. 
Someone might respond that if such people have the space to rescue animals but no easy 
access to chickens in need of adoption, they should rescue other animals ² their spaces might be 
suited to rabbits or guinea pigs, say. While this may be a commendable option for those who wish 
to take steps to avoid offering any support to hatcheries and other exploiters of chickens, some of 
those who are prepared to rescue chickens will not be prepared to rescue other animals. They may 
lack the motivation, expertise, or resources to suitably care for other animals, for instance. It¶s 
better that these individuals rescue some animals ² namely, some chickens ² than no animals, 
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and better to rescue chickens than other animals who they will fail to care for (and/or who will end 
up needing a new home in the future). It¶s also worth noting, again, that it¶s possible that the 
particular chickens who are presently available for sale have a right to be rescued. At the very 
least, they are facing rights violations imminently, and perhaps currently. The fact that some other 
animals (chickens or otherwise) could be rescued in their place doesn¶t change this. 
 
 
Conclusion  
 
We have shown that it can be permissible ² even assuming Regan¶s rights view ² to purchase 
chickens, keep them in our backyard, and eat their eggs. Now, we haven¶t taken a stand on whether 
an ideal conception of animal rights would recognize animals as property. Our argument only 
makes sense in a context in which chickens who likely face serious future rights violations are for 
sale. We could imagine that we live in a world in which animal rights are recognized, and that 
treating animals as property is consistent with respecting animal rights,42 meaning that there could 
be chickens for sale in an animal-rights-respecting state. These chickens wouldn¶t face a future of 
rights violations, and nor would purchasing them contribute to the profits of rights-violating 
industries. Such chickens would not be in any need of rescue, and so our line of reasoning would 
be irrelevant: there would be no reason to worry that purchasing chickens and caring for them in 
our own spaces would involve wrongs. On the other hand, if treating animals as property is 
inconsistent with respecting animal rights,43 then in an animal-rights-respecting state, all animals 
for sale would be in need of rescue, as the mere fact that they were being treated as property (by 
being put up for sale) would be violating their rights. But in such a state, there would be no need 
to purchase these chickens to rescue them, as you could simply notify the authorities, and the 
chickens could be rescued by agents of the state. 
We are doing ethics for a non-ideal world. We¶re assuming that animals have rights, and 
then exploring how we should behave in a world in which those rights aren¶t recognized. What 
we¶ve shown is that, given such assumptions, it can be permissible for individuals to purchase 
chickens, keep them in their backyards, and consume their eggs. As such, we¶ve offered yet 
another way to decouple a commitment to animal rights from strict veganism.44 
The qualifier µyet another¶ is important: we aren¶t the first to argue that animal rights or 
µvegan¶ perspectives permit the limited consumption of animal products, up to and including the 
eggs from chickens raised in genuinely humane conditions.45 We are, however, the first to argue 
that a firm endorsement of animal rights is compatible with purchasing chickens from industries 
that are directly involved in the infliction and perpetuation of rights violations against chickens. 
Our conclusion, however, certainly shouldn¶t be understood to be a defence of these industries, or 
an attempt to excuse those who support or benefit from them without good reason. It only shows 
that a commitment to animal rights is more complex than some might have thought. Such a 
commitment doesn¶t amount to shouting µForbidden!¶ to whatever previously seemed permissible. 
Instead, it involves the hard work of sorting out what sorts of actions, relationships, and political 
structures can, and can¶t, be defended given that animals are rights holders. Proponents of animal 
Page 14 of 16 
 
rights can, with a bit of ingenuity, identify a range of interspecies relationships and animal products 
that remain available in non-ideal circumstances, and others still that would be open in ideal ones. 
Despite what critics envision, a commitment to animal rights isn¶t commitment to species 
apartheid, self-abnegation, or puritanism, either in the present or the future. 
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